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Abstract: Nowhere does the theory-laden char-
acter of Husserl’s phenomenological intuitions 
become as apparent as in his reflections on cul-
tural philosophy. It is his theory that the qualifi-
cation of one‘s own tradition as one of many 
manifestations of something valid in itself and 
binding for all is a unique achievement of Greek-
European philosophy. However, that conviction 
can be found equally in South Asian (Indian) 
“doctrines of Oneness” as well as in East Asian 
(Chinese) instances of the “Golden Rule”. Every 
person with a command of a natural language is 
capable of such an insight. 
The most appropriate model for individual 
civilizations is not the sphere metaphor, which 
draws on a Platonic idea of organism, the model 
that Husserl adopted for his conception of 
“home” and “foreign worlds”, but rather the 
image of tinkering introduced by Claude Lévi-
Strauss for illiterate societies and used by Fran-
çois Jacob to illustrate the present biological 
concept of organism. 
Regarding cultural universals, Husserl also 
relies on classical ontological reflections rather 
than on recent biological models. The most inter-
esting anthropological universals from the point 
of view of cultural philosophy are, however, not 
essential, but contingent universals.. 
 Resumen: En ninguna parte el carácter cargado 
de teoría de las intuiciones fenomenológicas de 
Husserl se vuelve tan aparente como en sus re-
flexiones sobre la filosofía cultural. Según su teo-
ría, la calificación de la propia tradición como una 
de las muchas manifestaciones de algo válido en 
sí mismo y vinculante para todos es un logro único 
de la filosofía greco-europea. Sin embargo, esa 
convicción se puede encontrar igualmente en las 
"doctrinas de la unidad" del sur de Asia (India), así 
como en las instancias del este asiático (chino) de 
la "regla de oro". Cada persona con un dominio de 
un lenguaje natural es capaz de tal idea. 
El modelo más apropiado para las civiliza-
ciones individuales no es la metáfora de la esfera, 
que se basa en una idea platónica del organismo 
—el modelo que adoptó Husserl para su concep-
ción de "hogar" y "mundos extranjeros"— sino la 
imagen de retoque introducida por Claude Lévi 
Strauss para las sociedades analfabetas y utili-
zado por François Jacob para ilustrar el concepto 
biológico actual del organismo. 
Con respecto a los universales culturales, 
Husserl también se basa en reflexiones ontoló-
gicas clásicas más que en modelos biológicos 
recientes. Sin embargo, los universales antropo-
lógicos más interesantes desde el punto de vista 
de la filosofía cultural no son esenciales, sino 
universales contingentes. 
Keywords: Husserl. Cultural universals. Non-
European philosophy. Mankind. Organism. Thin-
kering. 
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Edmund Husserl’s reflections on cultural philosophy, like most of his hand-
written phenomenological meditations, are impressive for the careful articulation 
of concrete experiences. Their originality is indebted to the fresh immediacy of 
his writing, rather than their substantive yield. In substance, they coincide with 
views of cultural philosophy that were widely held in his day. A preference for 
phenomenal experience obviously does not preclude adherence to biased theory. 
In important points of his cultural philosophy, Husserl advocates views that are 
not in accordance with the current state of research in cultural studies and which 
most probably are not adequate to address the problems facing us with the mul-
ticultural circumstances in which we live. It is time for a critical discussion1. Hus-
serl’s lasting achievements are in other fields. 
1. THE GREEK INAUGURATION OF A UNIVERSAL PHILOSOPHY 
For Husserl, what is unique about Europe, what “is recognized in us by all 
other human groups” consists in a novel attitude towards the environment. Hus-
serl speaks in German of Umwelt, a term introduced by the behavioral scientist 
Jakob von Uexküll to characterize the world perception of animals2. According to 
Husserl, in European philosophy the experience of the environment is critically 
judged in terms of ideal truths and absolute values based on the theoretical at-
titude of “a few Greek eccentrics”3. A prephilosophical practical attitude leads to 
claims and evaluations based exclusively on additional experiences of the envi-
 
1 This paper is a revised version of “Europa und die Menschheit: Zu Husserls kulturphilosophischen 
Perspektiven”, in Elmar Holenstein, Kulturphilosophische Perspektiven, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1998, pp. 230-253; the current English translation is by Donald Goodwin and Kate Lawn. It was presented 
at a phenomenological symposium at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in 2006. Lester Embree, who 
has done so much for “doing phenomenology” all over the globe, was a coparticipant at this cross-cultural 
conference.  
The immediate incentive to write this essay was given a few years earlier by Klaus Held’s discussion 
in the line of Husserl and Heidegger of the “The primordial inauguration of philosophy and science among 
the Greeks” in lectures delivered at the universities of Bochum and of Louvain in the Husserl memorial 
year 1988. Cf. his article “Husserls These von der Europäisierung der Menschheit” [Husserl’s thesis of the 
Europeanization of mankind], in Christoph Jamme and Otto Pöggeler (eds.), Phänomenologie im 
Widerstreit [Phenomenology in Conflict], Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989, pp. 13–39, as well as my 
prior reading of Wole Soyinka’s Nobel Lecture of 1986: “This past must address its present”. 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/1986/soyinka-lecture.html. 
2 Umwelt could also be rendered today by “biotop”. Another alternative term with more human con-
notations, used by Husserl in other contexts, would be “lifeworld”. 
3 Edmund Husserl, “Die Krisis des europäischen Menschentums und die Philosophie” [The crisis of 
European Humanity and Philosophy], Wiener Vortrag 1935, in Husserliana VI (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1954,  
p. 336; English: “The Vienna Lecture”, in David Carr, Trans., The Crisis of European Sciences and Tran-
scendental Phenomenology, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970, p. 289. 
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ronment. Proponents of the theoretical attitude regard these as paltry approxi-
mations to what they consider absolutely valid ideal forms of what is imperfectly 
given in experience. 
Adopting this attitude means at once Europeanization and universalization: 
Europeanization inasmuch as it emerged according to Husserl “in Europe”4, and 
although it is only a “partial manifestation of European civilization”, it is “the 
functioning brain, so to speak, on whose normal function the genuine, healthy 
European spiritual life depends”; universalization inasmuch as, “starting from 
this, a supranationality of a completely new sort could arise”. Like every given 
opinion of an individual person, every cultural tradition will now be scrutinized in 
terms of truth per se of which it is apparently only one of infinitely many possible 
manifestations. According to Klaus Held, this attitude is “the fundamental mental 
precondition for the formation of a real world community”, which, in terms of 
factual history, is the result of Europe’s expansion to all continents. 
Such a view of the history of humanity’s ideas is dubious with respect to the 
data of comparative cultural studies, of the psychology of knowledge and of lan-
guage, and with respect to the philosophical tradition in which it stands. 
First, let us recall Max Weber’s “affirmation”, for everyone who knows it an 
unforgettable statement, “that in the field of thought about the ‘meaning’ of the 
world and of life there is nothing at all that has not in some form already been 
thought in Asia”, and that in soteriological contexts it has been “elaborated in a 
much bolder manner” than in the Occident5. Indeed, the achievement that Hus-
serl attributes to the Greeks can be found easily and quickly enough in Asian 
teachings of all-encompassing unity. For example, the following dictum has been 
handed down from the Daoist Zhuangzi from the fourth century BCE: “Viewed 
from the standpoint of the identical, the ten thousand [i.e. all] things] are one”6. 
From the perspective of psychology of knowledge and of language, too, Hus-
serl’s statement about the history of ideas is not convincing. It presupposes cog-
nitive abilities and categories that Husserl himself showed in exemplary fashion 
to be fundamental for everyday experience: the ability to perceive something not 
 
4 Actually so-called “European philosophy” first emerged in Anatolia, i.e. in Asia Minor, now a region 
of Turkey, as the work of descendants of Greek immigrants from present-day Europe. 
5 Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie [Collected papers on the sociology of 
religion], Tübingen: Mohr, 1921, pp. 365, 375. 
6 Quoted in modified form from Tomonobu Imamichi, “Die freie Wanderung des Denkens nach dem 
Einen” [The Free Migration of Thought towards the One], in Dieter Henrich (ed.), All-Einheit [Universal 
Unity], Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1985, p. 73. 
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just as that as which it immediately appears, but rather on a sort of variation 
continuum related to an optimum of itself (the red that one perceives can always 
be imagined to be more or less luminous, a form to be more or less clear-cut, in 
the best case in a way in which it can never be encountered in reality, but only 
depicted as an ideal type); the intuition that one can always continue one step 
further on a line, infinitely; the idea of equality, the insight that various manners 
of appearing can be of equal value. One can wonder where a person with a com-
mand of a natural human language could have achieved such command without 
elementary abilities and categories of this kind. 
If a claim is not tenable for objective reasons, a historical, psychological or 
sociological explanation can be sought for its emergence. Husserl’s archaeology 
of philosophy has a thrust that is indeed only a slight modification of fables from 
the history of ideas encountered in European philosophy since the time when the 
systematic structure of its systems was projected onto a line of historical devel-
opment, earlier stages of which still are purportedly encountered in vivo in pre-
sent-day non-European civilizations. There is no need to be an expert in the his-
tory of philosophy to find older versions of Husserl’s claim. It is enough to read 
the first African Nobel laureate’s prize lecture7. Wole Soyinka quotes Hegel8 ac-
cording to whom it is characteristic of the African that he has not yet “attained 
that realization of any substantial objective existence –as, for example, God, or 
Law– in which the interest of man’s volition is involved and in which he realizes 
his own being. This distinction between himself as an individual and the univer-
sality of his essential being, the African in the uniform, undeveloped oneness of 
his existence, has not yet attained: so that the knowledge of absolute Being, an 
Other and a Higher than his individual self, is entirely wanting”. For anyone who 
is white and also a philosopher, it is salutary to reflect on Soyinka’s refined com-
mentary on “this feat of imaginative projection”, supposedly the substance of the 
conception of philosophy, something which according to important European phi-
losophers was beyond his forebears: Convictions which in imperfect form are 
quite compatible, do not, when posited absolutely, readily remain a whole free 
of contradiction. Mutual tolerance (Soyinka’s concern) is in grave danger if ideals 
 
7 Soyinka, Nobel Lecture. 
8 G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte [Lectures on the Philosophy of 
History], Vol. 12 of Werke [Works], Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970, p. 122. For Soyinka, the question 
is “in what areas we encounter differences between the histories of societies which, according to Hegel 
and company, never conceived of this Omnipotent Extrusion into Infinite Space, and those who did”. 
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that are not completely compatible with one another are elevated to absolute 
principles. 
The Greek creation of philosophy and science probably happened no differ-
ently than other creative breakthroughs. The decisive point is not the initial idea. 
It is generally easy to find predecessors for that. The decisive point is what is 
done with it, the systematic elaboration and evaluation of this idea. 
The immediate historical context of Husserl’s thoughts about “the spiritual 
shape of Europe” was not Hegel’s speculations on world history, but rather the 
reflections in the years after the First World War among European intellectuals 
about what culturally unites the nations that had so madly fought one another. 
It was the efforts, often well meant, to overcome the shallow idolization of na-
tional distinctiveness in terms of culture and even character, an idolization which, 
with the support of philosophers, was then in vogue. There is no avoiding the 
impression that it was sometimes an effort to secure the habitual need for a 
feeling of superiority on a broader and worthier, namely a supranational Euro-
pean basis in the face of global shifts in significance. The dialectical climax was 
reached in Oswald Spengler’s book on the decline of the Occident. What the great 
majority of them lack (with the exception of studies such as Max Weber’s) is the 
application of precisely that scientific method that is so eagerly presented as the 
heart of Europe’s special cultural achievement. In Husserl’s circle, the most com-
mitted champion of this hyper-Europeanism was initially Max Scheler9. “Initially” 
inasmuch as even before the end of the war Scheler began to free himself of 
these ideas, advocating, in a manner not encountered in Husserl, “a certain bal-
ance of the specifically European and Asian” and a greater illumination of the 
“Asian roots” of classical antiquity and of Hellenism, which in particular has come 
to play a leading role in Europe’s humanistic values10. 
Could it be that at least the transferral of the notion of the idealized unity 
that remains one in the diversity of appearances to the one humanity and its 
various civilizations is of European origin? This, too, can be doubted. And even if 
it should turn out that this is the case, it would still have to be emphasized that 
it is only the factual emergence of this idea that can be called European (probably 
 
9 Max Scheler, Der Genius des Krieges und der Deutsche Krieg [The Spirit of War and the German 
War] (1915), in Vol. 4 of Gesammelte Werke [Collected works], Bern: Francke, 1982, pp. 7-250. 
10 Max Scheler, “Vom kulturellen Wiederaufbau Europas” [On the Cultural Reconstruction of Europe] 
(1918), in: Gesammelte Werke 5, Bern: Francke, 1954, p. 430. 
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thanks to favorable economic and social circumstances), but not its cognitive 
preconditions; its factual genesis, not its categorical structure. Husserl, too, 
seems to have been of this view. He speaks of a “factual motivation” for the 
“outbreak of the theoretical attitude” that he assumes among the Greeks11. But 
what he adduces —cross-cultural contacts, intellectual curiosity, and the oppor-
tunity for “playful looking-about”— can hardly be called specifically European. 
It is unlikely that there is a fundamental philosophical idea that is not in 
principle accessible to every person who has completed a normal cognitive de-
velopment. At the contemporary state of research on cognitive development and 
linguistic universals, it is quite simply implausible that for any central idea of 
European philosophy it is necessary, in Karl-Otto Apel’s words12, to adopt “the 
native language of the western mind” or to acquire cognitive categories available 
only in the Greek language and, mediated by its influence, in other European 
languages. The universal cognitive structures presupposed by natural human lan-
guages should be quite enough to be able to understand the basic philosophical 
concepts and assumptions. 
Of course, Apel’s view cannot be simply a priori dismissed. It must be tested 
with respect to specific linguistic structures familiar to us in our philosophical and 
scientific thought and at the same time lacking in some non-European languages. 
This has been done for unreal conditional clauses (‘If I had wings, I would fly’). 
Alfred Bloom had hypothesized that the lack of such clauses in Chinese is one 
reason why the Chinese less commonly think contrafactually, and that this must 
be taken into consideration as an explanation for the backward state of the de-
velopment of science in China13. The understanding experiments then conducted 
by other researchers with contrafactual stories and problems yielded evidence 
against Bloom’s claim14. That is no surprise. It pertains to human linguistic com-
petence not only that a person can say something in a certain way, but also that 
she can make the same thing understood with other linguistic or nonlinguistic 
means. Only if it were impossible or decidedly difficult to paraphrase in Chinese 
what is meant with unreal conditional clauses would an impediment to the devel-
opment of science be conceivable. 
 
11 Edmund Husserl, “Vienna Lecture”, p. 331f (German); p. 285 (English). 
12 Karl-Otto Apel, Die Idee der Sprache in der Tradition des Humanismus von Dante bis Vico [The 
Idea of Language in the Humanist Tradition from Dante to Vico] (1963), Bonn: Bouvier, 1975,  p. 40. 
13 Alfred Bloom, The Linguistic Shaping of Thought, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1981. 
14 Cf. Lisa G. Liu, “Reasoning Counterfactually in Chinese”, Cognition 21 (1985) 239-270. 
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In such connections it seems appropriate to quote an anecdote concerning 
the great Chinese emperor Kangxi (1654-1722). According to Joseph Needham, 
the emperor is said to have insisted that for the edition of a Jesuit book titled The 
New Western Science of the Calendar, the word for ‘Western’ had to be deleted. 
Needham says that the emperor had indeed recognized that the science put for-
ward in the book was new in substance, but not specifically Western15. To judge 
from other reportson the same emperor, he may well have thought not so much 
about a convergence of independently acquired and universally intelligible 
knowledge as of its derivability from the ancient Chinese Book of Changes16. 
Similarly, in Kangxi’s time there were still scholars in the West who believed that 
transculturally convergent philosophical views were attributable to biblical influ-
ences. There is no doubt that the modern sciences have been elaborated by Eu-
ropeans up to recent decades, and there is no doubt that they bear a European 
stamp in their linguistic structure. One could thus lean towards the following sub-
dued claim about the worldwide Europeanization of the sciences: Outside of Eu-
rope, there may well be original approaches to and anticipations of various 
achievements of European modernity, but due to the historically unique upswing 
of the sciences in the Occident together with the worldwide economic and political 
hegemony of the West, the European variants have been superimposed on these 
approaches and anticipations, sometimes even blotting them out. To a broad 
global extent, only the European variants have remained in effect and decisive 
for further development. 
Typographical printing can serve as an illustrative model for this point. It was 
invented in East Asia long before Gutenberg but never perfected as it was in the 
West. This is how it happened that the printing techniques now in worldwide use 
are derived from the European invention (and further developments of it) and 
have eclipsed home-born techniques in East Asia. Under such circumstances, 
however, it is never excluded that individual achievements of an eclipsed tradi-
tion will later be picked up and adopted as enrichments of the mainstream flowing 
from Europe. This is most readily to be expected in medicine. Therapeutics has 
always been a pioneer of cross-cultural influences. 
 
15 Joseph Needham, Chinas Bedeutung für die Zukunft der westlichen Welt [China’s Significance to 
the Future of the Western World], Bonn: Köllen, 1977,  p. 25. 
16 Jonathan D. Spence, Emperor of China: Self-Portrait of K'ang-hsi, New York: Knopf, 1974, p. 74. 
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But considerable reservations are called for even with respect to this toned-
down claim about the European character of the science and technology which 
have in fact been disseminated worldwide. From the very beginning and up to 
the early modern era, what for more than a century has triumphed over the 
entire planet as European science and technology is completely inexplicable with-
out considerable influences and stimuli from other civilizations. In philosophy, 
influences, or at least reinforcements for convergent developments can be de-
tected at various stages up to the middle of the nineteenth century. This influence 
is most obvious in the aesthetic realm. Modern arts are hardly conceivable with-
out non-European stimuli. There is good evidence for similar claims about medi-
eval poetry, and later, in a different manner, about some eighteenth and nine-
teenth century poetry. What has been repeatedly discussed in the twentieth cen-
tury as “European modernity” may be a European project, but it is by no means 
an exclusively European product17. 
This point is also overlooked outside of Europe. It is both a self-underesti-
mation and to the disadvantage of those concerned, when modernity is rejected 
as something Western. The contemporary worldwide reception of the scientific 
achievements of the last four centuries from the west is not the reception of 
something specifically European: not just because in cognitive terms it is some-
thing that is universally possible for human beings, and because in its best parts 
it is in accord with universal human dignity, but also because something is re-
turning to non-European civilizations that in many respects stems from them. 
With this return it can undergo innovations that are not to be expected in Europe. 
It suits such a reception that the conception of the world that the sciences are 
approaching —in some areas far removed from their “mechanistic” beginnings in 
the seventeenth century— is related to philosophical ideas that generally seem 
more “Eastern” than “Western”. One must not be put off by the fact that the 
philosophical attempts to come to terms with this development are initially dilet-
tantish and fashion-driven (currently called by the slogan “new age”). 
 
17 Looking for arguments for this view, I found a statement by Hans-Georg Gadamer in Volk und 
Geschichte im Denken Herders [People and History in Herder’s Thought], Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 
1942, p. 24: “The German consciousness […] lives from the entire breadth of its origins in world history”. 
With a view to the time, 1941, and the place, occupied Paris, of this lecture, one may overlook the wording 
and the concrete elaboration (which does not go farther back or beyond the “Greek polis”, and excludes 
the “democratic chatter of the West”, which, however, can be traced back to this polis). 
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The idea of a fundamentally dynamic nature, thinking in terms of relations 
and continua rather than of absolute magnitudes and discrete corpuscular sub-
stances as well as the assumption that opposites complement each other and do 
not simply exclude each other are all called “eastern” and at the same time (sci-
entifically) “new”. It is, of course, a great difference whether venerable philo-
sophical ideas are applied only after the fact as an aesthetically attractive super-
structure to newer developments in the sciences as a sort of ideological styling, 
or instead have effect as background assumptions that leave their mark more or 
less subliminally on scientific research, as has been repeatedly claimed in Europe 
with respect to biblical and Greek guiding ideas. Up to now, there is only isolated 
evidence that is not easy to judge for such a direct effect of an “Eastern” view of 
the world on concrete scientific research. 
There is also no guarantee that in the future innovation will remain a Euro-
peanization, an adaptation to the West. Whether an adaptation to a foreign civi-
lization or on the contrary an assimilation of the foreign to the own tradition 
occurs depends, among other things, on two very different factors: the wealth of 
the own history of ideas and —quite brutally— demography. Small nations can 
be culturally and politically absorbed by a superpower, a nation numbering a 
billion cannot. For China it is quite conceivable that the phase of adapting to the 
West will change into an assimilation of Western science, philosophy and art to 
Chinese traditions, which are not easily uprooted. The result would not be the 
continuation of the Westernization of China, but the other way round, a gradual 
Sinization of European achievements, at least in the Chinese sphere of influence. 
The ambition to such a reorientation is also not lacking in Islam and in India. 
2. THE MODEL OF CIVILIZATION: SPHERE OR TINKERING? 
Cross-cultural communication loses its hermeneutic mystery if it is recog-
nized that the contrast between “home world” and “foreign world” is objectively 
not of a holistic nature as it is often subjectively experienced. Nothing is more 
symptomatic of this than the impossibility of drawing a clear boundary between 
Europe and Asia. Where do the Transcaucasian Armenians belong with their Indo-
European language, Christianity dating back to the fourth century and even older 
contacts to Iran over thousands of years? The geographical delimitations that 
have been proposed in the course of time between the European subcontinent 
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and the Asian landmass to which it belongs have never coincided with a clear 
linguistic and cultural boundary or even with a stable political border. Genealog-
ical and typological delimitations generally do not coincide either. Statements 
such as the following by Max Weber are characteristic: “In its principles, Chinese 
music is closer to Hellenic than is German music”18.  
“A genuinely European type of person and culture” such as Scheler imagined 
at the beginning of the First Word War19 exists only as an idol even if ethnic 
minorities are high-handedly excluded as Husserl in 1935 still excludes “the Gyp-
sies, who constantly wander about Europe”20. The efforts to delineate “Euro-
peanism” with specific structures of mentality, attitudes towards the surrounding 
world, preferred values and regularities of head gestures become grotesque 
when, with other peoples of the Balkan region, the affiliation of the Greeks with 
Europe becomes questionable21. 
The easily entertained prejudice of the complete otherness of foreign civili-
zations, which tends to displace and even impede countervailing experiences, 
seems to be connected with a simple need for social identity. It seems to be a 
fundamental human need to belong to a group with which one can associate and 
at the same time dissociate from others. Such a group identity might be possible 
in a nonillusory manner with specific types of world view, lifestyles and tastes 
rather than with concrete civilizations. Their boundaries do not coincide with the 
crude boundaries generally drawn between civilizations and eras, but rather run 
across these, with unequal allocations of territory. The ancient Chinese sages 
would not have needed to warn against a “mechanistic attitude” (to use Bertrand 
Russell’s expression) or an attitude of “world domination” (in Max Weber’s cata-
logue) according to which for all materials, whether clay, wood, horse or human, 
every random form is just as beneficial as another if this were an exclusively 
European and modern attitude of mind. And Noam Chomsky, who sees the ulti-
mate excesses of this attitude in fascism and behaviourism (whereas a half cen-
tury earlier, Russell named, with a touch or sarcasm, the YMCA and Bolshevism), 
 
18 Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik [Collected Essays on Sociology 
and Social Politics], Tübingen: Mohr, 1924,  p. 490. 
19 Max Scheler, Der Genius der Krieges, p. 154. 
20 Edmund Husserl, “Vienna Lecture”, p. 273. 
21 Max Scheler, Der Genius des Krieges, p. 161. Scheler’s reservations are based on a superficial 
misinterpretation of the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ gestures in southeastern Europe, which seem to be completely 
different from the common ones. Cf. Elmar Holenstein, Menschliches Selbstverständnis [Human Elf-
Conception], Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985,  pp. 143-145. 
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could not cite romantics such as August Wilhelm von Schlegel as an antimecha-
nistic alternative living and thinking in the midst of Europe and the modern era22.  
Two civilizations A and B do not differ such that A has a bunch of specific 
properties that B lacks, and B another bunch of which A has nothing. It can be 
assumed that properties that are developed in particularly pronounced form in 
one civilization will be detectible at least in rudimentary form in most other civi-
lizations. What distinguishes two civilizations from each other is not so much the 
presence or absence of certain properties as the varying dominance of almost 
universally existing properties. Different properties are developed to a greater or 
lesser degree. Various cultural streams dominate (streams for which labels such 
as rationalist and empiricist, realist and idealist, legalist and pragmatic, puritan 
and hedonist, urban and rural, middle-class and the like are commonly used). 
And within one and the same civilization, the variations that are encountered 
among various professions, age groups, social strata, regions and eras are just 
as pronounced as those between civilizations. It is no accident that for Husserl 
the various “vocational worlds” formed the first beginnings of his conception of 
“particular worlds”. Aside from positive law, it is not easy to find anything that 
occurs in only one civilization, in all its members, but not in any members of 
another civilization23. 
A remarkable topic in the history of science is the parallels in the leading 
ideas of biology and of the sciences of language and culture since their emer-
gence in the eighteenth century. By no means is it the case that biology was 
always the forerunner. One example is the relationship between intra- and inter-
societal variation just mentioned, another is the transformation in the model of 
wholeness to be discussed next. Thus, at the current state of research in biol-
ogy24, it is assumed that there are greater variations between the individuals of 
one and the same human “race” than between the averages of various “races”. 
The tallest member of a “race” of small stature may be taller than the average 
of a “race” of large stature. In all probability, there are no genes or chains of 
genes that can be detected in all members of one “race” and in no members of 
 
22 Bertrand Russell, The Problem of China, London: Allen & Unwin, 1922, 82f; Noam Chomsky, Car-
tesian Linguistics, New York: Harper & Row, 1966). 
23 Husserl, too, knows that cultures “flowingly interpenetrate” one another; cf. “Vienna Lecture”, p. 
274. 
24 Stephen J. Gould, “Human equality is a contingent fact of history”, The Flamingo's Smile, New 
York: Norton, 1985, pp. 185-198. 
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another “race”. There are so many and such considerable variations to be found 
between the individuals of one “race” that there is relatively little additional var-
iation on making the transition to another “race”. Human “races” differ from one 
another in a few conspicuous outward features (skin colour, hair style) that make 
the assumption enticing that the overall deviation will be considerable. 
Husserl’s approach to Johann Gottfried Herder’s idea of individual civilizations 
as spheres25 in which all parts match each other and are oriented on a unified 
gravitation centre is empirically untenable and misleading as an ideal type. What 
is questionable is not so much the fact that this involves an assimilation of civili-
zations to biological organisms, with which the sphere metaphor has long been 
associated, but rather the classical concept of organism that leads the way here. 
Neither civilizations nor organisms are what they were long believed to be, har-
monious wholes with a unified center in which the opposing tendencies that occur 
always balance each other out. It is significant that in cultural anthropology as 
well as in biology, tinkering has taken the place of the sphere as an alternative 
model26. In something that is tinkered at, everything is connected to everything 
else, but it is often only loosely connected. Some things are only roughly matched 
with each other. Coordination is not perfect; generally, it is not hierarchically 
oriented on a unified center. Something that is tinkered at consists of pieces that 
in other contexts fulfilled other tasks that have left their mark on them, limiting 
them in their new application. It is not a rare occasion for something that is 
tinkered at to require sustained support from outside. 
The ancient key passage for the sphere as a model of the organism is the 
myth of the circular form of primal man in Plato’s Symposium27. The model was 
cultivated —together with Plato’s reference to the form of the heavenly bodies— 
particularly in the Romantic philosophy of nature28. 
 
25 See Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität: Texte aus dem Nachlass 1929-
1935 [On the Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity: Texts from the literary remains 1929-1935], Husserli-
ana XV, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973, pp. 429f, 438. According to Herder, Auch eine Philosophie der Ges-
chichte zur Bildung der Menschheit [1774] [Also a Philosophy of History towards the Formation of Human-
ity], Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1967, pp. 44f: “Every nation has its centre of bliss within itself as 
does every sphere its centre of gravity”. 
26 See Claude Lévi-Strauss, La pensée sauvage [The Savage Mind], Paris: Plon, 1962, pp. 26ff; and, 
with reference to Lévi-Strauss, François Jacob, “Evolution and Tinkering”, Science 196 (1977) 1161-1166. 
27 Plato, Symposium, 189d-190c. 
28 Lorenz Oken, Lehrbuch der Naturphilosophie [Textbook on Natural Philosophy], Vol. II, Jena: From-
mann, 1810, §§ 817, 911: “An individual, total body closed in itself and innervated and moved by itself is 
called an organism”. “As the image of the planet, the organism must have the corresponding form. That 
is the sphere”. Taking leave of the model of the sphere, it should not be forgotten that historians ascribe 
a fortuitous heuristic role to it in the early stages of cell biology (via the idea of the primal vesicle as the 
perfect organism). 
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It is not the case, as Herder29, one of the pioneers of the Romantic move-
ment, dreamed, that a civilization will only assimilate those points that are of its 
kind and which complement it, by reason of harmony rejecting everything else 
unfeelingly or even with contempt. Due to the diversity of human goals and the 
plurifunctionality of cultural structures, a harmonization in one subdomain and in 
one respect will lead to tensions in other subdomains and respects. If a special 
interest remains unsatisfied in one’s own country, one will look for resources and 
affiliates elsewhere. Foreign civilizations accommodate the wish of individuals to 
be distinct from the commonplace, the madding crowd, and to display noncon-
formity. No more than individual civilizations are individual people homogenous 
structures, monotonous and lacking in inner diversity. Cultural variations help to 
realize the potentials and needs for development to which people are disposed 
and which are as broad and varied as human civilizations themselves. Just as 
every person has the very specific disposition for the acquisition of every natural 
language, so too the disposition for every human civilization, as foreign as it may 
be. To be aroused and developed, however, these dispositions need external 
stimulation. 
Of course, the assumption that civilizations are unique, incommensurable 
wholes did not emerge unmotivated. Two overlapping reasons must be taken into 
consideration here, the reciprocal dependency of content and form and that be-
tween the whole and its parts. 
From antiquity until well into the modern era, the dominant pattern of 
thought had it that people everywhere had to do with (nearly) the same things, 
that they have the same ideas of these things and only differ in the manner in 
which they give these ideas expression. With the emergence of the Romantic 
movement, there also emerged a gradual realization that content (meaning, 
function) and form (of expression) are not completely external to each other in 
natural systems (living beings and languages). Inasmuch as the various lan-
guages differ from one another in their phonetic and grammatical form, it was 
therefore reasonably concluded that they also differ from one another in their 
cognitive potential. Belief in cognitive universals thus became questionable. 
The explosive character of newer universals research vis-à-vis classical doc-
trines of a grammatica universalis consists precisely in the fact that it also detects 
 
29 J. G. Herder, Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte, p. 45. 
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general regularities on the level of expression; and according to the principle of 
the dependency of the content on the form, this gives cause to expect universal 
structures in the field of meanings. If, for example, the same regularities hold 
universally for the structure of semantic fields, then it is to be expected that the 
meaning of the individual words of such a field will be universally comparable30. 
According to the hermeneutic principle of the semantic dependency between 
wholes and their parts, each element of a civilization can only be understood on 
the basis of its entire context. And this is different from situation to situation. It 
seems that the same structure obtains a different, specific function or interpre-
tation depending on its changing context. 
However, we must beware of untenable idealizations here. If someone were 
to attempt to harmonize with one another all the assumptions that guide him in 
his action, he would need the memory, the logical competence and (in order to 
calculate whether all the consequences that can be derived from these assump-
tions are compatible) the time of a demigod. If for the individual the unlimited 
validity of the hermeneutic principle lacks an empirical basis, all the more so for 
entire civilizations. The premature assumption that a literary work that has been 
handed down from antiquity forms “an original whole” results in “true madness” 
according to Friedrich Schleiermacher, one of the fathers of hermeneutics31. This 
applies all the more to large-scale phenomena such as civilizations. 
The claim that despite undeniable differences in contexts there are cognitive 
categories and beliefs to be found almost uniformly in all civilizations is likely not 
only ex negativo, for lack of sufficient resources to realize convictions in harmony 
with one another. It also admits of positive reasons. Four assumptions can be 
adduced in support of it. There are good arguments for all of them. 
(1) Due to the fact that neural structures are the same among humans, some 
stimulus constellations to which all people are exposed seem to coexist with phe-
nomenal experiences of a very certain kind with a lawlike necessity. Just as in 
other realms of nature (for example in the propagation of light at a certain speed 
or in the occurrence of specific macrophysical properties of water in a specific 
microphysical situation), logical possibility (the conceivability of different constel-
lations of properties) and lawlike natural necessity must be distinguished. 
 
30 More on this point in Section 3. 
31 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutik und Kritik [Hermeneutics and Criticism] (1838), Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977,  p. 176. 
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(2) Some of these phenomenal experiences are accompanied just as natu-
rally by certain interpretations. There are not only civilization-determined, but 
also nature-determined intuitions. Perceptual illusions are a classical example. It 
is accepted that (except for limit cases) there are no theory-free experiences. It 
is also accepted that any set of empirical data is compatible with an unlimited 
number of distinct theories if enough auxiliary hypotheses are presupposed. But 
what is logically possible is not so readily psychologically natural. The structures 
required for the various theories must be equally accessible to the human mind. 
Though unexplained, it is an amply corroborated fact that for certain phenomenal 
experiences certain specific interpretations are preferred. 
(3) Some of these intuitive interpretations are theory resistant. Perceptual 
illusions are again the best example. Although we have known for four hundred 
years that the earth revolves around the sun, the opposite view forces itself upon 
us. We may be able to overcome the opinion that persistently presents itself, but 
we cannot thus make the appearance that the sun moves on the horizon disap-
pear. 
(4) For lack of reflection, the self-assertiveness of intuitive convictions is 
stronger than the tendency towards harmonization with the other convictions 
that we have. Our cognitive background, which goes to influence all our explicitly 
developed theories, is probably full of such convictions which have never been 
reflected on. 
The assumption of cultural universals goes hand in hand with the assumption 
that civilizations are not logically consistent structures in which everything and 
all things, in particular the background assumptions that take effect everywhere, 
match one another. The relative autonomy of individual cognitive structures is 
one presupposition for their comparability across civilizations and eras. Intracul-
tural disunity (incoherence, plurality) makes intercultural unity (invariance, uni-
versality) possible. 
3. UNIVERSAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
Among the headwords that Husserl noted in the prologue to one of his later 
manuscripts is the appealing title “universal anthropology”. In order to assess his 
contributions to this problem field, it is best to make a contrastive comparison of 
recent research (since about 1960) on what could be common to all languages 
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and civilizations with the traditional doctrines of universals in the middle ages, 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as well as the anthropological literature 
of the first half of the twentieth century. In five primary respects, the former is 
distinct from the latter. In one of these respects, Husserl was a pioneer, though 
in a way that he himself did not envisage. In a second respect, he approved of 
the opening without engaging in it. In the other three respects, he remained 
uncritically on the traditional side, which must be regarded as outdated. The dif-
ferences pertain to the relationships between (1) absolute and relational univer-
sals, (2) a priori grounds and empirical explanation, (3) categories of meaning 
and expression, (4) abstract essential features and concrete fine structure, and 
(5) nature and culture. 
(1) In his third Logical Investigation, Husserl did pioneering work on the laws 
of foundation —evidenced by his influence on Roman Jakobson— contributing to 
the modern assumption that it is not so much individual categories that are uni-
versal as the relationships between categories, in particular relationships of im-
plication32. It is for example universally valid that a language will only have a 
dual (a definite plural) if it also has a plural (an indefinite plural). By contrast, a 
plural without a dual is possible as we know from German and English. It is often 
the case that whole chains of such implicational constraints can be made out 
(trial  dual  plural  singular). Their explosive force lies in the fact that given 
their validity universalism and pluralism are no longer contradictory. The new 
universalism does not deny the diversity of languages and civilizations. (How 
could it?). What it disputes is the randomness of the variation. Its main interest 
is the universal constraints of (inter- as well as intracultural) variation. 
(2) Husserl was fundamentally open for the extension of universals research 
from structures that can be founded a priori, ontologically or logically to struc-
tures admitting of an empirical, biological or psychological explanation. A fore-
runner of empirical universals research in Husserl’s environment was Anton 
Marty33. The empirical explanation of the greater number of cultural universals is 
 
32 See Elmar Holenstein, Roman Jakobson’s Approach to Language: Phenomenological Structuralism, 
Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1976, pp. 2, 98-101. 
33 Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. 2 (19132), Husserliana XIX/1, The Hague: Nijhoff, 
1984, Fourth investigation, § 14; English: Logical Investigations, Trans. J. N. Findlay, London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1970, Vol. 2, pp. 522ff; Anton Marty, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen 
Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie [Investigations on the Foundation of Universal Grammar and Philoso-
phy of Language], Halle: Niemeyer, 1908, pp. 56ff. 
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associated with the fact that many of them do not apply without exception and 
must be regarded merely as near universals. 
The transformation that thus occurred in the history of science has not yet 
been adequately reflected. Kant still contrasted deduction and illustration as op-
posites, and not, as is today the case, logical justification and causal explanation. 
In human history and in everything subjective that is not of a logical nature, it 
was traditionally believed and is still believed by strong schools of philosophy 
that we are faced merely with the accidental, which can only be narrated, but not 
ordered in a lawlike manner. Simply trace the history of the influence of the 
Protagorean claim that all people have their own sense perception (as if no uni-
versal conditions could be found under which the same wine tastes sweet to one 
person and bitter to another, the same water seems warm to the one and cold 
to the other) in Western philosophy from Plato’s Theaetetus34 to today. What is 
conspicuous is on the one hand the extension to everything subjective. Thus, for 
Frege35 it holds for all subjective “ideas and intuitions” that accompany linguistic 
expressions beyond meaning and reference. On the other hand, in the course of 
time, quite clearly in Kant36, the view has become predominant that even for 
judgements of taste empirical generalizations are possible. Since, however, they 
are apparently only based on inductions, Kant uses the term ‘general’ for them 
rather than ‘universal’. This superior term remained reserved for what can be 
logically deduced. Contemporary universals researchers in linguistics and psy-
chology assume as a matter of course that in their sciences empirical generali-
zations are fundamentally susceptible to deductive-nomological explanation just 
as in the physical sciences. 
(3) Husserl’s guiding concern, “to separate the a priori sharply from the em-
pirical”37, caused him to overlook, in conspicuous contrast to Marty, the fact that 
universal regularities can be found not only on the side of meaning categories, 
but also on the side of the expression, “with respect to the form which means of 
expression take on and must take on everywhere”38. Husserl remained bound to 
 
34 Plato, Theaetetus, 161d. 
35 Gottlob Frege, “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” [On Sense and Reference] (1892), in Kleine Schriften, 
Darmstadt: WBG, 1967,  pp. 30f (original pagination). 
36 I. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft [Critique of Judgement] (1790), in Vol. V of Gesammelte Werke: 
Akademie Ausgabe [Collected Works: Academy Edition], Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1913, § 7. 
37 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, Fourth investigation § 14, pp. 524f. 
38 Anton Marty, Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und 
Sprachphilosophie, p. 55. 
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the ancient and medieval pattern of thought according to which expression and 
meaning, like container and content, are completely independent of each other39. 
(4) According to a view that was widespread in the humanities in the first 
half of the twentieth century, it is only the most basic traits that are common to 
people of different civilizations, but not the concrete elaboration of these basic 
traits, according to the pattern: all languages have functional words, but whereas 
we use prepositions, others use postpositions. Husserl shared this prejudice40, 
but in his day there was more cause to it than today. It loses plausibility when 
the universal traits are biologically explained. The animals of a species usually do 
not have only a general design in common, but also anatomical and physiological 
details. It is precisely such details that serve taxonomists as identifying traits. 
(5) In the course of the modern era, a naturalistic reorientation of the foun-
dation of universals occurred. The basis is to an increasing extent not logic, but 
rather nature. What can be considered to be universal is from now on (in Kant’s 
words) “what nature makes of the human being”, but not what the human beings 
make of nature, what they “make or can and should make of themselves as 
beings that act freely”41. What is common to all humans42 is limited to the lower 
layers of the foundation of mental worlds, to the physical, physiological and such 
psychological aspects for which Husserl, splendidly vague in this point, used the 
term ‘animistic’, speaking then of a “universal animism”. According to his later 
reflections on cultural philosophy43, beyond this (and before the “Europeanization 
of humanity”) it is only the ego character of the human being, its interpretation 
as a subject of action, that is universal: “The other person is for us a living body, 
an ego active in the living body, but beyond this general point a non-understood 
ego”. In other people, the only things that are immediately familiar and accessi-
ble to empathy are “only the most proximate and universal human goals, related 
to the most general needs and forms (types) of satisfaction of needs occurring 
 
39 Cf. the evidence in Holenstein, Menschliches Selbstverständnis, pp. 128f, 196f —With (1) the as-
sumption of universal ideas despite the variety of forms of expression, (2) the form of the sphere as the 
model of society, and (3) the application of the Protagorean principle to perceptual or subjective experi-
ence, we have encountered three guiding ideas of cultural philosophy which under Plato’s influence have 
made their mark on European thought for centuries. In cultural philosophy, too, it becomes apparent that 
Western philosophy still indulges in writing footnotes to Plato. 
40 Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, 433ff. Cf. the quotations in the next 
paragraph. 
41 I. Kant, Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht [Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View] 
(1798), in Vol.  VII of Gesammelte Werke, 19172, Vorrede [Preface]. 
42 Aside from the logical, as long as this is assumed to be autonomous. 
43 Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, pp. 433ff. 
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everywhere among human beings, similarly related to external objects similar to 
each other with regard to individual type”. The (linguistic, literate, aesthetic, re-
ligious, and philosophical) cultures that are built up on this basis are different 
from one another in a more radical manner, one that Husserl does not go into, 
than two trees differ from each other, the one a palm tree, the other a pine tree. 
This assumption, too, does not withstand empirical examination. The most 
palpable universal laws concerning how human beings relate to nonperceptual 
matters can be found in the numeral systems of natural languages, that is, in a 
field of the ideal par excellence44. 
An unlimited variability of “higher” mental performances would presuppose 
an openness and plasticity of the human mind that is hardly compatible with its 
finitude and the dependency of its conceptions on psychological processes. In the 
past, intellectualists substantiated this metaphysically with the “spontaneity of 
mind”, behaviourists with the randomness of stimulus-response pairs depending 
solely on external circumstances, reward and survival advantage, free of innate 
constraints. 
According to the then prevalent pattern of thought, nature is the lasting fac-
tor, history the changing one. Such simple classifications are, however, not pos-
sible. The colour of the eyes and of the hair are by nature innate to the human 
being. And nonetheless they vary. If it is assumed that there is a cognitive struc-
ture common to all human beings, then additional reasons will be accordingly 
needed, for example, the ability of every normal human child to acquire every 
natural language. It is also possible that the nature of the human being is not 
completely independent of his history, at least in the early stages. In particular, 
in connection with the development of language there are serious speculations 
that in the case of the human brain nature took on its form in a co-evolution of 
organism and civilization, through a stepwise adaptation to what “primitive” man 
(Rousseau’s primitive, as we would have liked him) had previously made of his 
nature. 
In uncovering cultural universals, one is today sometimes exposed to the 
suspicion that one adheres to a holistic ideological ideal and that one favors to-
 
44 See Joseph H. Greenberg, Universals of Human Language, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1978, Vol. 3, pp. 249-296. 
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talitarianism in various forms. Someone who has this sort of misgiving has thor-
oughly missed the point. For the one part, it turns out that the assumption of 
transcultural invariants is only tenable if civilizations are not systems où tout se 
tient, where everything coheres, when not every element has an effect on the 
significance of every other. On the other hand, it has proved to be easier to make 
universal species-specific statements about all human beings (statements that 
apply to all human beings and only to them, but not to other living beings) than 
to make general population-specific statements about individual societies, na-
tions, ethnies, civilizations, and eras. 
Nonetheless, in continental European philosophy of culture, the opposite view 
is continually advocated, from Herder through Spengler in, one would think, an 
offensive continuity passing by the catastrophe of National Socialism and across 
ideological chasms. It is not the universalists, but rather the relativists (with their 
talk of “the culture or the civilization of the West”, “the philosophy of China”, and 
the like), who, in contradiction to their own intention, are the terrible simplifiers. 
Thus, Michel Foucault famously writes, and there are simple facts of the history 
of science to refute him: “In any given culture and at any given moment, there 
is always only one episteme that defines the conditions of possibility of all 
knowledge”45.  
Husserl closely approached this intellectual tradition in his reflections on cul-
tural philosophy in the thirties, although as a young philosopher he had refrained 
from it in his contact with Thomas Masaryk46. At the same time he became a 
victim of its worst excesses. When, in the last years of his life, he thought of 
escaping from this danger together with his work by migrating to Masaryk’s coun-
try, it was already too late: Czechoslovakia, with its commitment to the cultural 
promotion of minorities and asylum seekers (first from the eastern, then from 
the western neighbor), was already as threatened as he was himself. Totalitarian 
claims, that is the moral of Husserl’s fate, are less a global threat than a national 
and regional threat, one within particular states, societies, and social groups. 
 
45 “Dans une culture et à un moment donné, il n'y a jamais qu'une épistémé, qui définit les conditions 
de possibilité de tout savoir” (Michel Foucault, Les mots et les choses, Paris: Gallimard, 1966, p. 179; 
English: The Order of Things, New York: Random House, 1970, p. 168). 
46 Husserl saw himself in the tradition of Thomas Masaryk, “my first educator”, in his intention of 
“securing an ultimate scientific foundation for the spirit of a supranational humanity” with phenomenolog-
ical philosophy (Karl Schuhmann, “Husserl and Masaryk”, in Josef Novák (ed.), On Masaryk, Amsterdam: 
Rodopi, 1988, pp. 129-156).  
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What can provide protection, as demonstrated by similar contemporary fates, is 
the worldwide possibility for communication and solidarity. In this respect, uni-
versalism and pluralism are not only compatible with each other, they are also 
conducive to each other. 
 
